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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision on December 24, 2009.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a), and in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(5) and Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals opinion is reported at Lopez v.
United Auto. Ins. Co.. 222 P.3d 1192 (Utah App. 2009). A copy of the opinion
is attached in the addendum and marked as Exhibit A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, The
Utah Supreme Court granted United Automobile Insurance Company (UAIC) and
El Sol Insurance Agency, LLC's (El Sol.) Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to the
following issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and/or application of
the meaning of the "reasonable explanation" required by Utah Code. Ann. §
31A-22-305.3(2)(g).
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to remand for ascertainment of
the amount of damages.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On certiorari, this court reviews the court of appeals' decision for
correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's
decision under the appropriate standard of review. Pratt v. Nelson. 164 P.3d
366, Tf 12 (Utah 2007). When performing this review, this court reviews the
lower court's legal decisions for correctness, without deference. See Rawson v.
Conover. 20 P.3d 1J 25 (Utah 2001).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
The following subsections of Utah Code § 31A-22-302 (2006) are controlling in
this appeal:
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall
include:
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305.3, unless
affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305.3(2)
Additionally, Utah Code § 31A-22-305.3(2) (g) (i) and (ii) (2006) are
controlling in this appeal. These subsections provide:
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(g)(i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302(l)(a).
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage and when it would be applicable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Appellee Maria Lopez (Lopez) individually and on behalf of a
purported class sued Defendants/Appellees UAIC and El Sol for breach of contract
and negligence. (R. 1). After stipulations were filed, UAIC and El Sol filed a
motion for summary judgment. (R. 39-51). In response, Lopez filed a motion for
partial summary judgment with affidavits of Maria Lopez and non-party, Miriam
Salazar, the named insured under the applicable policy issued by UAIC, along with
a Rule 56(f) affidavit of her counsel. (R. 52-82). In her motion for summary
judgment Lopez did not request that damages be awarded to her. Instead, Lopez
requested the Court to rule that she had $25,000 in underinsured motorist coverage
available to her. Id.

UAIC and El Sol filed a reply memorandum in support of

their motion for summary judgment, a memorandum opposing Lopez's motion for
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summary judgment, a motion to strike the affidavits of Lopez and Salazar and a
motion to strike the Rule 56(f) affidavit. (R. 83-107 and 116-127).
On September 4, 2008, following briefing and oral argument, the trial court
issued a memorandum decision and order granting UAIC and El Sol's motions to
strike the affidavits of Lopez and Salazar. The court also struck the Rule 56(f)
affidavit and granted UAIC and El Sol's motion for summary judgment on all 3
counts of Maria Lopez's complaint. The court also denied Maria Lopez's motion
for partial summary judgment. (R. 147).
Maria Lopez timely filed an appeal of the trial court's decision. The Court of
Appeals on December 24, 2009 issued a decision affirming in part, reversing in
part and remanding the case to the trial court. (Ex. A).
UAIC and El Sol subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the
Utah Supreme Court that was granted May 13, 2010. In this appeal, UAIC and El
Sol are asking this Court to rule that the Court of Appeals incorrectly reversed the
trial court's entering of summary judgment in their favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Non-party Miriam Salazar purchased a UAIC policy through the independent
insurance agent El Sol on February 1, 2007. (R. 36). On February 8, 2007 Salazar
was driving the automobile covered by the policy with Lopez as her passenger and
they were involved in an accident. In her complaint, Lopez alleges that she is
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entitled to underinsured motorist coverage. (R. 1-12). However, the named
insured, Salazar, signed a form complying with Utah law rejecting underinsured
motorist coverage. (R. 36-38, UAIC 00030, Exhibit B).
Utah law permits a named insured to completely reject underinsured motorist
coverage. Utah Code Ann §31A-22-305.3(2) provides:
(g) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under
Subsection 31 A-22-302(l)(a).
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage and when it would be applicable.
The requirements for a rejection of underinsured motorist coverage are that the
rejection be in writing and on a form provided by the insurer that includes a
reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage. That statute does not
define "a reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage" but the
Insurance Code does define "underinsured motorist coverage".
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(a)(i) reads:
Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22302(1 )(c) provides coverage for covered persons who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death.
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The term "underinsured motorist coverage" is not defined anywhere else in the
Insurance Code. UAIC utilized the definition found at 31 A-22-302(l) to supply its
own explanation of "underinsured motorist coverage", which UAIC advances
reasonably explained the purposes of underinsured motorist coverage and when it
would be applicable. Thus, there is no dispute that Salazar signed a written form
provided by UAIC.

It is also clear that the form contained a reasonable

explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would
be applicable.
As an out-of-state insurer UAIC looked to the Utah Insurance Code for a
reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage. UAIC's form read:

AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS
BODILY INJURY COVERAGE
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305 requires that every
automobile policy include Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily
Injury Coverage with limits equal to the Bodily Injury limit, unless
you select a different limit than your Bodily Injury Coverage or reject
the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage
entirely. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage
provides payment of certain benefits for damages caused by the owner
or operator of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness, disease or death.
(See Exhibit B).
The definition provided by UAIC on its form is nearly identical to the
definition of the term provided by the Utah Insurance Code.
6

On this form, Miriam Salazar selected uninsured motorist coverage equal to her
bodily injury liability limits and rejected underinsured motorist coverage entirely.
Id- Miriam Salazar signed the form confirming that she understood and agreed to
the selection of these limits. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly held that the rejection form signed by Miriam Salazar
clearly incorporated statutory language to reasonably explain the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage and when underinsured motorist coverage would
be applicable as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(g). Accordingly,
the trial court correctly granted UAIC and El Sol summary judgment because no
genuine issues of material fact existed that UAIC and El Sol met the statutory
requirements of Utah Law for an insured to affirmatively waive underinsured
motorist coverage.
The Utah Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's decision.
The Court of Appeals erred in its construction and/or application of the meaning of
the "reasonable explanation" required by the statute. The Court of Appeals,
without citation or reasoning, summarily concluded that the explanation of
underinsured motorist coverage contained on the UAIC form was not a reasonable
explanation.

The Court of Appeals made this conclusion even though the

explanation contained on the form was nearly identical to the definition of
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underinsured motorist coverage contained in the Insurance Code and was on a
form filed for use with the Utah Department of Insurance. This conclusion was in
error and violated proper statutory construction.
The explanation of underinsured motorist coverage contained on the UAIC
form was a reasonable explanation because (1) it utilized a nearly identical
definition of underinsured motorist coverage contained in the statute, (2) was in
plain English, (3) was unambiguous and (4) was on a form that was accepted for
use in this State by the Department of Insurance.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals erred when it remanded the case to the trial
court to enter judgment in favor of Lopez in the amount of $25,000. Lopez only
filed a motion for partial summary judgment.

Lopez' motion for summary

judgment only sought an order that the waiver was insufficient as a matter of law
by failing to comply with the applicable statute. (R. 114). She did not seek
damages. In her memorandum of points and authorities in support of her motion
for partial summary judgment Lopez merely requested that she be given coverage
in the amount of her bodily injury liability limit of $25,000; not that she be
awarded $25,000. (R. 106).
UAIC and El Sol request that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed
and that the trial court's granting of summary judgment be affirmed. If this Court
affirms the Court of Appeals' decision by deciding partial summary judgment for
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Lopez was correct, UAIC and El Sol then ask that the case be remanded to the trial
court to decide the issue of damages, if any.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION
AND/OR APPLICATION OF THE MEANING OF THE
"REASONABLE EXPLANATION" REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(g).

Section 31A-22-305.3(2)(g) governs the complete rejection of underinsured
motorist coverage. This section provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(g)(i)

A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage
by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability
coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a).

(ii)

This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the
insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose
of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would be
applicable.

Therefore, to constitute a valid rejection of underinsured motorist coverage,
Miriam Salazar's rejection had to be in writing, on a form provided by UAIC and
contain a "reasonable explanation" of the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage and when it would be applicable. There is no issue that the rejection was
written and on a form provided by UAIC. At issue is whether UAIC provided Ms.
Salazar with a "reasonable explanation" of underinsured motorist coverage.
The rejection form read in relevant part:
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AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS
BODILY INJURY COVERAGE
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305 requires that every
automobile policy include Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily
Injury Coverage with limits equal to the Bodily Injury limit, unless
you select a different limit than your Bodily Injury Coverage or reject
the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage
entirely. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage
provides payment of certain benefits for damages caused by the owner
or operator of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness, disease or death.
(R. 36-38, UAIC 00030, Exhibit B).
It is UAIC's position that the waiver form complies with Utah law. First,
UAIC's definition of underinsured motorist coverage closely mirrors the statutory
definition of the term. Second, the language of the form is plain and clear. No
complex or complicated language is used. If the Court of Appeals had correctly
construed and/or applied the meaning of the "reasonable explanation" required by
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3(2)(g) it would have found that the form contained
a reasonable explanation, and affirmed the trial court's decision granting summary
judgment to UAIC and El Sol.
A. BY
UTILIZING
THE
VIRTUALLY
IDENTICAL
DEFINITION OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST AS THE
ONE CONTAINED IN THE INSURANCE CODE, THE
REJECTION FORM PROVIDED A REASONABLE
EXPLANATION
OF
UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST
COVERAGE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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The form utilized by UAIC contained nearly the identical definition of
underinsured motorist coverage as the one contained in the Utah Insurance Code.
This virtually identical definition constitutes a "reasonable explanation" as
required by the Utah Code Add. §31A-22-305.3(2)(g). The Court of Appeals erred
in its construction and/or application of the meaning of "reasonable explanation"
when it held that the form at issue did not meet the requirements in that statute.
This rejection form contains a reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist
coverage and when it would be applicable because it tracks the statutory language
in the Utah Code and is simple, direct and easy to understand. The Utah Code
defines "underinsured motorist coverage" as follows:
Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-302(l)(c)
provides coverage for covered persons who are entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles
because of bodily injury sickness or death.
See Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-305.3(2)(a)(i). The language explaining
underinsured motorist coverage on the rejection form is virtually identical to the
definition contained in the applicable statute. Accordingly, the written form signed
by Miriam Salazar rejecting underinsured motorist coverage contains a reasonable
explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would
be applicable. It seems impossible to argue that an explanation is not reasonable
when it is virtually identical to the explanation provided by the Insurance Code.
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Moreover, the definition is simple, direct and contains no words or language that
an ordinary lay person would not understand.
The Court of Appeals believed that UAIC did not provide a reasonable
explanation of underinsured motorist coverage because the definition tracked by
UAIC referenced another section of the code. According to that court, this meant
that the legislature intended the definition of underinsured motorist coverage given
in the statute be read in the "context of the entire statutory scheme." (Exhibit A, p.
6).

That analysis is flawed. First, the reference within the definition of

underinsured motorist coverage was merely referring to 31A-22-302(l)(c) which
requires every policy of insurance purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's
security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, unless affirmatively waived. The
Insurance Code's reference to that subsection does not offer a more detailed
explanation of underinsured motorist coverage, and its omission by UAIC does not
make its explanation of underinsured motorist coverage less reasonable. Second, it
is illogical to require a carrier to include a copy of the entire insurance code. The
definition in the Insurance Code stands alone and plainly sets forth the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage. UAIC deliberately relied upon the Utah Insurance
Code to provide its reasonable explanation of Underinsured Motorist Coverage.
UAIC's incorporation of nearly identical language from the Insurance Code
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provides a "reasonable explanation" of the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage and when it would be applicable.
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE UTILIZED IN THE REJECTION
FORM CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE EXPLANATION OF
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE AS REQUIRED
BY THE STATUTE.
The term "reasonable explanation" is not defined by case law, statute or
regulation. Although it is not defined in the statute, it is not ambiguous, for the
legislative meaning can be gleaned from the definition of the individual words
comprising the phrase. See State Ex. Rel. A.C.. 97 P.3d 706, If 13 (Utah App.
2004).

Additionally, this Court has a long history of relying on dictionary

definitions to determine plain meaning. See State v. Redd. 992 P.2d 986, ^f 11
(Utah 1999).
"Reasonable" is commonly defined to mean "not extreme or excessive" or
"fair". State Ex. Rel. A.C. at U 14. "Reasonable" is defined as "sensible, not
excessive". See Webster's New World Dictionary. 2nd Edition (2002). In the area
of law, "reasonable" is defined as "fair, moderate, and suitable under the
circumstances." See Black's Law Dictionary. Sixth Edition (1991). "Explanation"
means "the act or process of explaining".

See Merriam-Webster Online

Dictionary. "Explain" means "to give the meaning of. See Webster's New World
Dictionary. 2nd Edition (2002).
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Accordingly a "reasonable explanation" of underinsured motorist coverage is a
sensible, fair, not excessive process of explaining or giving the meaning of
underinsured motorist coverage. Therefore, a "reasonable explanation" is not a
rigorous standard to meet. The purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is to
provide payment of certain benefits for damages caused by underinsured persons.
Underinsured motorist coverage is applicable when damages are caused by owners
or operators of underinsured motorist vehicle.

The purpose of underinsured

motorist coverage and when it would be applicable are simple and plainly
explained in the definition utilized by UAIC.
Despite the seemingly easy burden of providing a "reasonable explanation" the
Court of Appeals, without any case law citation, other than non-applicable dicta
contained in General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. V. Tipton, 158 P.3d 1121, (Utah
App. 2007), cert. Denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007)), concluded that the
explanation of underinsured motorist coverage provided by UAIC was not a
reasonable explanation. UAIC did provide a "reasonable explanation" with its use
of unambiguous language that mirrored the language of the Insurance Code,
especially because a "reasonable explanation" does not denote a rigorous standard.
The explanation supplied by UAIC on its rejection form used ordinary words
and provides that Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage provides payment
of benefits for damages caused by the owner or operator of an underinsured motor
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coverage. It is difficult to determine how this does not meet the requirement of a
reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when
it would be applicable.
In finding that the form did not comply with the statutory requirements, the
Court of Appeals violated the rules of statutory interpretation by inferring and
adding additional terms or requirements that are not present in the Insurance Code.
Courts must not read into statutes terms the legislature could have included but
did not. When interpreting statutes courts look first to the statute's plain language
with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent. See Savage
v. Utah Youth Vill.. 104 P. 3d 1242, | 18 (Utah 2004). Courts presume that the
legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary
and accepted meaning. See State v. Barrett. 127 P.3d 682, Tf 29 (Utah 2005). In
performing statutory interpretation courts refrain from reading additional terms
into the statute. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus. 164 P.3d 384, ^J 53 (Utah
2007).
The statute only requires a "reasonable explanation." In its decision, the Court
of Appeals, without any direct citation, requires the form to include information
that goes beyond a reasonable explanation. The Court of Appeals in finding that
the explanation was not reasonable conclusively notes that to be reasonable the
insurer must demonstrate that a meaningful offer of coverage was made and that
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that goes beyond a reasonable explanation. The Court of Appeals in finding that
the explanation was not reasonable conclusively notes that to be reasonable the
insurer must demonstrate that a meaningful offer of coverage was made and that
offer was sufficient to permit the insured to make an intelligent, informed decision
on desired or desirable coverages. Lopez at U 15. Additionally, the Court of
Appeals concludes that the form does not give that reasonable explanation using
language that would be understood by an ordinary consumer.

Id. at f 20.

Although, the Court of Appeals concedes that a lengthy treatise on underinsured
motorist coverage was not required, it provides no further explanation as to the
requirement for a reasonable explanation, or why UAIC's explanation was not
reasonable.
Since the rejection form is virtually identical to the statutory definition of
underinsured motorist coverage, for a court to hold that the rejection form does not
contain a reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage, it would also
have to declare that the statute defining underinsured motorist coverage is vague
and ambiguous. No court has found that statute vague or ambiguous.
The Court of Appeals' claim that UAIC failed to provide a reasonable
explanation because it combined its discussion of underinsured motorist and
uninsured motorist coverages is equally unpersuasive.

Until recently, those

explanations were combined in the Insurance Code and with separate places to
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party Salazar clearly understood the explanation that there were two different
coverages, because she selected uninsured motorist coverage and rejected
underinsured motorist coverage. See Ex. B.
In addition to utilizing the statutory definition of underinsured motorist
coverage, and writing the explanation in unambiguous language, the form utilized
by UAIC wasfiledfor use with the Utah Department of Insurance pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §31A~21-201. See Exhibit C. Pursuant to that Insurance Code
subsection, the Insurance Commissioner may prohibit the use of a form at any time
upon a finding that the form is inequitable, unfairly discriminatory, misleading,
deceptive, obscure, unfair, encourages misrepresentation, or not in the public
interest. See §31A-21-201(3). The Department of Insurance was authorized to
prohibit the use of the form if it was misleading or deceptive. The fact that the
State of Utah did not prohibit the use of this form supports the conclusion that the
form contained a reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage.
Virtually every form utilized by an insurer is similar if not identical to the form
utilized by UAIC in this case. The Court of Appeals, without any real explanation
or guidance, has decided the explanation utilized by UAIC was not reasonable,
invalidating the signed waiver of underinsured motorist coverage. If this erroneous
decision without case law, statutory or regulatory support is allowed to stand,
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virtually every automobile insurance policy in the state will come under scrutiny.
The legal andfinancialimpact will be immense.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals exercised an improper interpretation of
insurance policy language. An insurance policy is a contract between two parties.
See Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, H 14 (Utah 2007). If the
language within the four corners of the policy is unambiguous, the parties' intent
should be surmised from the plain meaning of the contractual language. Id.
Unambiguous language is given its ordinary meaning. See Alf v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993). Insurance policy language is
considered ambiguous if it is unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used to express
the intentions of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible
meanings. See Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P. 3d 428, f 15 (Utah 2006).
Accordingly, to find that UAIC did not provide a reasonable explanation of
underinsured motorist coverage, the Court of Appeals would be required to find
that the language utilized by UAIC in its explanation was ambiguous. The Court
of Appeals did not make such a finding. The explanation as cited above, is in plain
English, is clear, does not omit terms and may not be understood to have two
meanings. The Court of Appeals erred in holding the explanation not to be
reasonable.
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meanings. The Court of Appeals erred in holding the explanation not to be
reasonable.

II.

THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to
award Appellee damages in the amount of $25,000. The issue of damages was
never addressed in the trial court or the appeal. The amount of damages allegedly
suffered by Appellee Lopez needs to be supported by evidence and is a jury
question. Damages are a question of fact, and questions of fact are distinctly
within the jury's province. See Judd v. Drzega. 103 P.3d 135, f 34 (Utah 2004).
Summary judgment should be granted only if there has been a showing, that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(C). When reviewing
a Court of Appeals decision to reverse a trial court's decision granting summary
judgment to a Defendant and remanding for summary judgment to be entered in
favor of the Plaintiff, this court reviews the Court of Appeals' legal decisions for
correctness, without deference. See Rawson at ^ 25. Additionally, this Court
reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn there from in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Id.
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Lopez has not made a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact
that she is entitled to judgment in the amount of $25,000 as a matter of law. Lopez
only filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and did not request the trial
court award damages. Further the record does not contain any evidence of the
amount of damages allegedly suffered by her as a result of this accident. In her
motion for partial summary judgment, Lopez only sought an order that the waiver
was insufficient to comply with the applicable statute.

(R. 114).

In her

memorandum of points and authorities in support of her motion for partial
summary judgment Lopez merely requested that she be given coverage in the
amount of her bodily injury liability limit of $25,000 (R. 106). Lopez's motion
was a motion for partial summary judgment because she only sought an order on
the liability issues and not damages.
Accordingly, if this Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment to El Sol and UAIC it
still should correct the clear error of the Court of Appeals instructing the trial court
to enter judgment in favor of Lopez in the amount of $25,000 and remand the case
for ascertainment of the amount of damages.

20

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in its construction and/or
application of the meaning of the "reasonable explanation" required by Utah Code
Ann. §31A-22-305.3(2)(g). Additionally, assuming that the Court of Appeals did
not err on that issue, it erred in failing to remand the case for ascertainment of the
amount of damages. Accordingly, UAIC and El Sol respectfully request that the
Court of Appeals' decision be reversed and that the trial court's granting of
summary judgment to them be affirmed. In the alternative, UAIC and El Sol
respectfully request that the Court of Appeals' decision be reversed in part, so that
an ascertainment of the amount of damages can be conducted in the trial court.
DATED t h i s ^ day of June 2010.
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.

MICHAJ^J. C(5LClNS
Attorneys for Appellants UAIC and
El Sol Insurance Agency
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McHUGH, Judge:
\1
Plaintiff Maria Lopez appeals from the trial court's order
granting Defendants United Automobile Insurance Company (United
Auto) and El Sol Insurance Agency, LLC's (El Sol) motion for
summary judgment, which resulted in the dismissal of Lopez's
claims, We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND1
H2
On February 1, 2 007, nonparty Miriam Salazar purchased an
automobile insurance policy (the policy) from El Sol, acting as
United Auto's agent, As part of her application for coverage,
Salazar signed a form provided by El Sol that waived underinsured
motorist (UIM) benefits,

1

Because summary judgment was entered by the trial court, we
recite the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. See Orvis v, Johnson, 2008 UT 2, \ 6, 177 P.3d 600,

5|3
One week after Salazar's insurance policy took effect, she
was driving the insured automobile with Lopez as her passenger
and was struck by another car. Although Salazar was not injured
by the accident; Lopez sustained several serious injuries. The
other driver was at fault f or the accident, and his insurer
tendered its policy limits of $25,000 to Lopez. However, that
amount waB insufficient to pay the costs associated with Lopez's
injuries, Lopez subsequently demanded UIM benefits from United
Auto, which refused to pay based on the form Salazar executed
rejecting those benefits.
14
Lopez brought suit against Defendants, alleging that they
failed to comply with the requirements of the UIM coverage
statute', sjee Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3 (Supp. 2009) 2
(providing for mandatory availability of UIM benefits and setting
forth the obligations of the insurer before such benefits may be
effectively rejected)/ that Defendants breached their duty of
good faith and fair dealing by failing to explain and offer UIM
benefits adequately to Salazar/ and that Defendants were
negligent because they failed to explain UIM benefits adequately
to Salazar and because they did not provide the relevant forms in
Spanish.3 In response, Defendants filed a counterclaim, Beeking
a declaratory judgment that the form waiving UIM benefits
complied with the UIM coverage statute and, therefore, Lopez was
not entitled to receive UIM benefits under Salazar's policy.
^5
After conducting discovery, both parties filed motions for
summary judgment. The trial court denied Lopez's motion and
granted Defendants' motion in part,4 which resulted in the
dismissal of Lopez's claims, The trial court concluded that
Lopez lacked standing to reform the contract to include UIM
benefits where Salazar had rejected UIM coverage. The trial
court also determined that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing does not extend to third parties and that, in any event,
2

As a convenience to the reader, we cite to the current
version of the code. The relevant statutes have been renumbered
and amended, but there have been no substantive changeB to the
pertinent sections of the statutes since the time of the
accident.
3

Salazar's first language is Spanish/ she speaks very little
English, El Sol caters to the Spanish-speaking community.
^Because the trial court denied Lopez's claims, it also
denied Defendants' counterclaim for summary judgment, stating
that there was no longer "a justiciable controversy between the
parties," and that, therefore, a declaratory judgment "would be
advisory and would exceed the Court's jurisdiction." That ruling
is not challenged on appeal.
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the form provided by El Sol "clearly incorporates statutory
language to reasonably explain the purpose of [UIM] . , .
coverage." Finally, the trial court held that Defendants were
not negligent because they did not owe any duty to Lopez, Lopez
appeals these decisions.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
^|6 Lopez argues that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants on her contract and negligence
claims. We "review[] a trial court's legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and
viewU the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v.
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, H 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) .5 Thus, we do not accord any deference
to the trial court regarding its "resolution of the legal issues
presented[,] and [we] determine only whether the trial court
erred in applying the governing law." Ervin v. Lowe * B C O S . , 2005
UT App 463, % 8, 128 P,3d 11 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz, v. Tipton, 2 007 UT App
109, ^| 7, 158 P.3d 1121 ("In an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment, . . . we give no deference to the trial court's
decision.")/ cert denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007).
ANALYSIS
I, The Trial Court Was Correct in Entering Judgment in Favor of
Defendants on Lopez's Negligence Claim,
1|7
Defendants challenge Lopez's standing to assert negligence
claims against them.6 Typically, we would consider this issue
before turning to the parties' substantive arguments. See Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. , 1999 UT 41, % 9, 979 P.2d
346 (stating that standing is a threshold issue that must be
addressed before proceeding to further inquiries on the merits).
However, Defendants' challenge to Lopez's standing is intertwined
with the more substantive question of whether the Defendants owed
a duty to persons, like Lopez, who were unidentified at the time
5

Both parties concede that there are no genuine issues of
material fact in dispute relevant to this appeal.
6

On appeal, Defendants do not conteBt
connection with her contract claim and the
Rather, they argue that she lacks standing
negligence claim because any duty they had
not extend to Lopez.
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Lopez's standing in
UIM coverage statute.
to pursue her
was to Salazar and did

that Salazar purchased the automobile insurance.
we discusB these concepts together,

Consequently,

%B
"The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question
of law to be determined by the court," which determination we
review for correctness. Ferree v. State, 784 P,2d 149, 151 (Utah
1989) . To recover under a negligence theory, "a plaintiff must
. , . establish a duty of care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff," which requires a showing that the IM defendant is
under an[] obligation for the benefit of a particular
plaintiff.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting ProsBer & Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 53, at 356-57 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds. , 5th
ed. 19B'4)). T O determine whether a duty exists, we Hanalyz[e]
the legal relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of
injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which party
can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other
general policy considerations, Legal duty, then, is the product
of policy judgments applied to relationships," Normandeau v.
Hanson Equip. , Inc. , 2009 UT 44, H 19, 215 P,3d 152 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
%9 On appeal, Lopez argues that Defendants had a duty to
explain UIM coverage fully to Salazar, including providing
insurance forms to Salazar in Spanish. Even assuming that
Defendants owed such a duty to Salazar, it does not necessarily
follow that the duty extended to Lopez. While recognizing that
Defendants likely owed Salazar a duty to inform her adequately
about UIM coverage, the trial court held that this duty did not
extend to unidentified future passengers like Lopez, The trial
court explained that fulfilling a duty to inform future
passengers "would be difficult, if not impossible, to do,"
elaborating on these difficulties as follows:
For example, an insured rejects [UIM]
coverage. A week later, the insured offers a
ride to a new co-worker the insured just met.
If they were involved in an accident, the new
co-worker would be a statutory third partybeneficiary to the insured's policy.
However, the new co-worker would not have
received information that the insured
rejected [UIM] coverage until he or she made
a claim to the insurer and such claim was
denied. At the time of contracting, neither
the insured nor the insurer could have
anticipated that a [particular] "stranger1'
would be riding in the insured's vehicle and
therefore, would be a statutory third party
beneficiary entitled to notice of the
insured's waiver of [UIM] coverage. Under
[Lopez's] theory, the insurer would have had
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a duty to inform the new co-worker without
the ability to do so and [Lopez's] theory
would require the insurer to provide the
waived . . . [UIM] coverage. The Court does
not agree that the insurer's statutory duty
to inform extends this far.
HlO We agree with the trial court's reasoning and legal
conclusion that the duty to inform does not extend B O far as to
reach unknown third parties who may later be passengers in an
insured's vehicle. Therefore, as a matter of law, Lopez is not
within the group of persons who can assert a negligence claim
against Defendants, and we affirm the trial court's entry of
judgment in favor of Defendants on the negligence claim.
II.

Lopez Is Entitled to Judgment on the Contract Claim.

^11 Lopez next argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded
that the form provided by El Sol complied with the UIM coverage
statute.7 See generally Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 . 3 (2) (b)
(Supp. 2009) (detailing the requirements for an insured to
purchase UIM coverage that is less than the policy's liability
limits); id. § 31A-22-305.3 (g) (detailing the requirements for an
insured to waive UIM coverage). The trial court's
"interpretation of [the] statutory provision is a question of law
that we review for correctness." General Sec. Indem. Co. of
Ariz, v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, f 7, 15B P.3d 1121, cert,
denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007).
^12 Lopez argues that the form is deficient because it "fails to
'reasonably explain[] the purpose of [UIM] coverage'" and "[d]oes
[n]ot [d]isclose the additional premiums required to purchase UIM
coverage." (Quoting Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2) (b),) In
response, Defendants argue that the form's language "contains a
reasonable explanation of the purpose of [UIM] coverage" because
it mirrors the statutory language defining "[UIM] coverage." See
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305,3(2) (a) (i) . Defendants also argue
that disclosure of the additional premiums is not required under
the statute's waiver provision, Bee id. § 31A-22-305 .3 (2) (g) , but
instead is only required under the statute's provision for
selecting UIM benefits in an amount less than the policy's
liability limits, see id^ § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b).
^13 We first address Defendants' contention that the form
provided a reasonable explanation of the purpose of UIM coverage,
as required by the statute. "When presented with questions of
^Although the trial court partly based its ruling on Lopez's
lack of standing to seek reformation of the policy, Defendants
conceded at oral argument that Lopez has Btanding to do so.
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statutory interpretation, our aim is to discover the true intent
and purpose of the [1] egislature, " and we look to the statute's
plain language to determine "the statute's meaning [and to]
clarify the intent and purposes behind its enactment." Tipton,
2007 UT App 109, 1 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) .
Therefore, we begin our analysis of the form's compliance by
looking to the language of the waiver provision of the UIM
coverage statute. It provides, in pertinent part: " (i) A named
insured may reject [UIM] coverage by an express writing to the
insurer that provides liability coverage . . . .
(ii) This
written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of [UIM]
coverage and when it would be applicable." Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-305.3(2)(g).
^ 14 The form Salazar signed states: "Uninsured/Underinsured
Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage provides payment of certain
benefits for damages caused by the owner or operator of
uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease or death." As Defendants note, the form tracks
portions of the language of the statute, which provides that
" [UIM] coverage . . . provides coverage for covered persons who
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators
of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death." Id^ § 31A-22-305.3 (2) (a) (i).
According to Defendants, the fact that the form's language is
taken from the statutory definition of UIM coverage conclusively
demonstrates that the form's explanation was reasonable. We do
not agree,
Hl5 Turning first to the statute, we see nothing in Utah Code
section 31A-22-305.3 (2) (a) (i) that indicates that thiB section
was intended to constitute the reasonable explanation to a
consumer of insurance products required by Bection 31A-22305.3(2) (g) . To the contrary, the definition is placed at the
beginning of the UIM coverage section along with the definitions
of the other terms used in the statute. See Utah Code Ann,
§ 31A-22-305.3 (1) , (2)(a)(ii). Furthermore, the definition
itself refers to another section of the statute, 31A-22202(1) (c) , to further illuminate the meaning of UIM coverage. By
the placement of and cross-reference used in the definition, it
is apparent that the legislature anticipated that the definition
would be used in the context of the entire statutory scheme-provisions which may not be readily available to the average
consumer. Consequently, we see nothing in the statute that would
create a safe harbor for Defendants due to their inclusion of
some of the statutory definition in the form.
^16 Because there is no presumption of compliance, we now
consider the reasonableness of the explanation provided to
Salazar. In doing so, we are guided by this court's prior
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decision in General Security Indemnity Co, of Arizona v, Tipton,
2007 UT App 109, 158 P,3d 1121, cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah
2007) . In Tipton, the insured claimed that her selection of
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage at a level lower than the
statutory minimum was invalid where the application form did not
attempt to explain the purposes of UM coverage or provide any
information regarding the different premiums for higher levels of
UM coverage as required by the applicable statute. See id. %*h 2,
8. We agreed that the application did not comply with the
statute, making the plaintiff's waiver of higher UM coverage
invalid. See icL 11 23.
^17 In reaching that conclusion, we relied on the legislative
history of the UM and UIM statutes, see id. 1 11 n.6/ noting that
the "statutes are designed to protect insureds by providing
compensation to those who are injured or killed by uninsured
motorists or other financially irresponsible motorists" and that
the "statutes are designed for the benefit of insureds and not
insurers. [They are] adopted to benefit the insured motorist,
and tare] not intended to relieve . . . insurers of primary
responsibility . . . or to benefit them in any way." Id. % 13
(emphases added) (alterations and omissions in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted), Accordingly, the statute
places .the burden on the insurer to show that the form provided a
reasonable explanation of the purposes of UM coverage. See id.
H 15. To meet that burden, the insurer must demonstrate that "a
meaningful offer" of coverage was made and that the offer waB
"sufficient to permit the insured to make an intelligent,
informed decision on desired or desirable coverages.11 Id. Thus,
" [t]he insurer has an affirmative duty to notify the insured in a
manner reasonably calculated to place necessary information in
the insured ' s hands." Id.
^18 Although Tipton addressed the issue in the context of the
selection of lower UM coverage, rather than the complete
rejection of UIM coverage, the Tipton court relied on the
legislative history of the UIM provisions in its analysis,
stating that it was "comfortable being guided by" the legislative
history and policy of the closely analogous UIM provision. See
id, H 11 n,6. In light of our previous statements in Tipton and
the nearly identical language of the UM and UIM coverage
statutes, we are similarly comfortable relying on the Tipton
court's analysis of the UM statute in our analysis of the UIM
statute here.
^19 The central policy underlying Tipton is that the statute
imposes an "affirmative duty" on insurers to provide consumers of
insurance products with information in a clear, understandable
way that will empower them to make informed decisions regarding
UM and UIM coverage, See id. % 15. The form provided by El Sol
states that UIM coverage "provides payment of certain benefits
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for damages caused by the owner or operator of
uninsured/underineured motor vehicles." We agree with Lopez that
this language fails to provide consumers like Salazar with the
information needed to make an informed decision regarding
insurance coverage. Indeed, the form's language omits
information in a way that makes it less understandable than the
statute defining UIM coverage. While the statute provides
separate definitions for "uninsured motorist coverage", see Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (3) (a) (Supp. 2009), and "underinsured
motorist coverage,» see icL § 31A-22-305.3(2)(a)(i), thereby
highlighting their distinct purposes, the explanation in the form
combines the two into a single definition, referring to them
collectively as "Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury
Coverage." Likewise, there is nothing in the form that explains
the differences in the "certain benefits" provided by UIM
coverage as compared with UM coverage or "when it would be
applicable," as required by the UIM coverage statute, see id.
§ 31A-22-305.3(2) (g) (ii) . In contrast, the legislature
separately addressed each type of insurance, compare id. § 31A22-305 (UM coverage), with id. § 31A-22-305.3 (UIM coverage),8
and included the definition of UIM coverage among other defined
terms in the UIM coverage section, see id. § 31A-22-3 05 ,3 (1) (2) (a) .
5|20 The UIM statute provides a definition that can be used in
connection with its other provisions to determine the obligations
of insurers with respect to UIM coverage. One of those
obligations is to provide consumers electing whether, and in what
amount, to purchase coverage a "reasonable explanation of the
purpose of [UIM] coverage and when it would be applicable." Id.
§ 31A-22-305.3(2) (g) (ii) . The definition in the form provided to
Salazar does not give that reasonable explanation using language
that would be understood by an ordinary consumer. Although
Defendants were not required to provide Salazar with a lengthy
treatise explaining UIM coverage, they had an affirmative duty to
use a form that provided Salazar with a reasonable and
understandable explanation of the purpose of UIM benefits that
would enable her "to make an intelligent, informed decision"
regarding the selection of UIM coverage. Tipton, 2007 UT App
109, \ 15/ Bee also Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2) (g) (ii) .
Because the form provided by Defendants did not provide a
reasonable explanation, Salazar's waiver of UIM coverage was
invalid. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305,3(2) (g) (ii) ,
B

Although the earlier version of the statute dealt with both
UM and UIM in a single section of the Utah Code, see Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-305 (2005) (current version as amended at Utah Code
Ann. §§ 31A-22-305, -305.3 (Supp. 2009)), UM coverage was
addressed in subsections (2)-(7), while UIM coverage was
separately covered by subsections (8)-(11),
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Therefore, Lopez is entitled to UIM benefits under the policy,
which the statute requires to be in an amount uequal to the
lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability
coverage or the maximum UIM coverage limits available by the
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy," id. § 31A-22305.3(b).9 In this case, the parties agree that amount 1 B
$25,000,
CONCLUSION
H21 We affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of Defendants on the negligence claim because they owed no
duty to Lopez to explain UIM coverage to Salazar, The trial
court was incorrect, however, in granting summary judgment in
favor of Defendants on the contract claim. Because the form
provided by Defendants did not reasonably explain the purposes of
UIM coverage and when it would be applicable as required by the
UIM coverage statute, Salazar1s waiver of coverage was invalid
and Lopez is entitled to receive UIM benefits, We therefore
reverse the trial court's order granting Defendant's summary
judgment motion and remand for entry of judgment in favor of
Lopez in the amount of $25,000.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

^22

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T, Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
9

Because we conclude that the form did not provide a
reasonable explanation of the purposes of UIM benefits, we
decline to address Lopez's contention that Defendants were
required to disclose the additional premiums for UIM coverage.
However, we noted in General Security Indemnity Co. of Arizona v.
Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, ^ 9 n.5, 158 P,3d 1121, cert, denied,
168 P. 3d 819 (Utah 2007), that there are different statutory
requirements for waiver of all UM benefits and waiver of a higher
level of coverage. See id,
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TJST ALL ACCIDENTS AND VIOLATIONS i ^R ALL DRIVERS BELOW
MlfllAM

Date
200S-06-OI

Description of Accident or Violation
SPEEDING OVLK 01-10 MI'H ABOVE LIMIT

MIRIAM
MlltlAM

2006 02 01
2001 09-01

SPEEDING OVEK 01-10 MPH ABOVE LIMIT
DKIVING W/O VALID DL, OK WHILESUS/KEVOk

Dnvei NBme

Driver//

Location

AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED MOTORISTS PROPERTY DAMAGE COVERAGE
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305(4) requires that every automobile policy which does noi provide insurance lor
collision damage shall provide coveiage foi pioperty damage to the moloi vehlcle(s) described in the policy, to the extent that
you aie legally entitled to recover from the owner 01 operatoi of an uninsured motor vehicle This coveiage shall not exceed
the molor vehicle's actual cash value or $3,500, whichever is less, and is subject to a 1250 deductible I have read the above,
and agiee to the deletion of Uninsured Motorists Property Damage Coverage
I have read & understand this waiver

Date 02/01/2007

Signature of Applicant X_

AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS BODILY INJURY COVERAGE
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305 requires that every automobile policy include Unlnsured/Undermsured Motorists
Bodily Injury Coverage with limits equal to the Bodily Injury limit, unless you select a different limit than your Bodily Injury
Coverage or reject the Uninsuied/Undennsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage entirely Unmsured/Undeiinsured Motorists
Bodily Injury Coverage provides payment of certain benefits for damages caused by the owner or operator of
unlnsured/undennsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death Please indicate your desire to
entirely reject Uninsured/Undennsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage oi whethei you desire this coverage at limits other
than the Bodily Injury limits of your poticy
•

a I heieby reject Uninsured Motorist Coverage

[X) b I hereby reject Undennsured Motorist Coverage
[g

c I hereby select Uninsured Motorists Coverage limits of 25000/50000 which equals my Bodily Injury liability limits

n

d I hereby select Undennsured Motorists Coverage limits of

which equals my Bodily Injury liability limits

I understand and agree to the selection of any of the above options to my liability insurance policy Future renewals or replacements of this
policy will be issued at the same Uninsured/UndennsuwMotonst limits JLLdecide to select another option at some future time, I must let the
Company oi my agenl in writing
/ / /
^
\
/f
^. si
Signature of Applicant X ( '////M*
r \ ^ k ^
D a t e 02/01/2007
AGREEMENT V^IVING PIP LOSS OF GROSS INCOME BENEFITS
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-307 requires that every automobile policy include Personal Injury Protection Insurance
Code Section 31 A-22-307(4) also allows you to waive loss of gross Income benefits under Personal injury Piotectlon
Coverage, subjBd ID the following requiiement The Named Insured must certify in writing that toi the previous 31 days and
lor at least the nexl 1B0 days, neither the insured noi the insured's spouse will received earned income from regular
employment I have read the above, and agree to the waiving of loss of gross income benefits under Personal Injury
Protection Coveiage
02/01/2007

Signature of Applicant X

Dote

NAMED DRIVER EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT
WARNING - READ THIS E N D O R S E M E N T CAREFULLY!
This acknowledgement and rejection is applicable to all renewals issued by any affiliated insurer or us
In consideration of the premium charged for this policy, H is agreed we shall not be held liable a n d no liability 01 obligation of
any kind shall attach to us for bodily injuries, tosses or damages undei any of the coverages of the policy while any motoi
vehicle is operated by an Excluded Duvet

EXCLUDED DRIVER(S) NAMES
TTi ANCISCOTVSCNCIO

""

RELATIONSHIP

t
Dale 02/01/2007

Signature of Applica
2 of 3

BIRTHDATE

SEX

04/15/1980

Spuubc

mx

///ess/**,^\^as^^
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

MARIA LOPEZ, individually and on behalf
of all similarly situated person,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Florida corporation, EL SOL
INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, a Utah
corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
PLAINTIFF'S FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVITS AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVITS
Case No. 070422402

Defendants.
Judge Terry L. Christiansen
This matter came before the Court on August 4, 2008, for hearing on Defendants United
Automobile Insurance Company and El Sol Insurance Agency, LLC's (jointly referred to as
"Defendants" or individually as "UAIC" and "ESIA") Motion for Summary Judgment, Maria Lopez'
("Plaintiff) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of
Salazar and Lopez and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Bertch. Daniel F. Bertch
appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, Michael J. Collins appeared on behalf of Defendants. The Court
took the matter under advisement.
Having considered the parties arguments, briefs and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS
both Defendants' Motions to Strike Affidavits of Salazar and Lopez and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Bertch and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the

BACKGROUND
On February 8,2007, Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by non-party Miriam
Salazar ("Salazar") when non-party Abie Martinez ("Martinez") rear-ended the vehicle operated
by Salazar and occupied by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered severe injuries in the
accident, including injuries to her head, neck, back, legs and other parts of her body.
UAIC issued a motor vehicle policy, policy number UTS 000611667, to Salazar with a
policy period of Febmary 1, 2007 through August 1, 2007, that did not include underinsured
coverage, but did include uninsured coverage as reflected by Salazar's signed application.1
1

A week before the accident, on February 1,2007, Salazar signed an application for
insurance with Defendants that included the following language:
AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS
BODILY INJURY COVERAGE
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305 requires that every automobile policy
include Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage with limits
equal to the Bodily Injury limit, unless you select a different limit than your
Bodily Injury Coverage or reject the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily
Injury Coverage entirely. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury
Coverage provides payment of certain benefits for damages caused by the owner
or operator of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease or death. Please indicate your desire to entirely reject
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists/Bodily Injury Coverage or whether you desire
this coverage at limits other than the Bodily Injury limits of your policy.
• a. I hereby reject Uninsured Motorist Coverage.
B b. I hereby reject Underinsured Motorist Coverage.
H c. I hereby select Uninsured Motorists Coverage limits of 25000/50000
which equals my Bodily Injury liability limits.
• d. I hereby select Underinsured Motorists Coverage limits of
which equals my Bodily Injury liability limits.
I understand and agree to the selection of any of the above options to my liability
insurance policy. Future renewals or replacements of this policy will be issued at
the same Uninsured/Undersmsured Motorist limits. If I decide to select another
option at some future time, I must let the Company or my agent in writing.

Martinez was insured by Progressive Insurance Company ("Progressive") with liability
limits of $25,000. Progressive tendered its limits to Lopez and UAIC consented to the settlement
and waived its rights of subrogation against Martinez.
Thereafter, Plaintiff made a claim to Defendants for underinsured motorist benefits.
Defendants rejected Plaintiffs claim because Salazar did not have underinsured coverage.
On December 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed the present law suit against Defendants alleging
three causes of action: Count I for Individual Contract Claim by Lopez, Count II for Class Breach
of Contract Claim, and Count IE for Individual Negligence Claim.
Defendants filed their joint answer and counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment on
January 23, 2008.
Thereafter, the parties filed the cross motions for summary judgment and cross motions to
strike.
CROSS MOTIONS TO STRIKE
Upon reviewing Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Salazar and Lopez and
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Bertch, the Court concludes that the
information in those affidavits are not necessary for the Court to render a decision. The Court's
decision is partially based upon Defendants duty to Plaintiff and standing to bring a claim, which
are a matter of law. Further, the parol evidence rule bars extraneous evidence that attempts to
contradict or vary the terms of a written document. For these reasons, the Court summarily

Signature of Applicant: x

/s/ Miriam Salazar

Date: 02/01/2007

GRANTS both Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Salazar and Lopez and Plaintiffs
Motion to Strike Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Bertch.
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
considering cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court is not bound to grant it to one
side or another. Diamond T. Utah, Inc. V. Travelers Indent. Co., 441 P.2d 705 (1968).
PLAINTIFF'S COUNT I - Individual Contract Claim by Lopez
Plaintiff claims that Defendants owed non-party Salazar a duty to explain underinsured
motorist coverage, to set forth the option to accept or decline underinsured motorist coverage,
and if desired, to select one of various limits or amounts of coverage according to respective
premiums. Plaintiff claims that Defendants failure to offer underinsured motorist benefits
constituted a breach of good faith and fair dealing required of them as a first party insurance
provider. Plaintiff claims Defendants duty to non-party Salazar extended to her as an occupant of
Salazar's car. The Court disagrees that Defendants duty to non-party Salazar extended to
Plaintiff
'The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an implied contractual provision, and a
cause of action for its breach sounds in contract." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789,
798 n.8. "Utah law clearly limits the duty of good faith to first parties to insurance contracts.
Consequently, only a first party can sue for breach of that duty." Speriy v. Speriy, 990 P.2d 381,
T| 7 (Utah 1999). In Utah, the term "first party" is used to refer to an insurance agreement where
the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses suffered by the insured.

In contrast, a "third party" situation is one where the insurer contracts to defend the insured
against claims made by third parties against the insured and to pay any resulting liability, up to
the specified dollar limit. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Shores, \A1 P.3d 456, 461-62 \
25 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)(citing Sperry v. Speny, 990 P.2d at ffl 7-8); see also Pixton v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. \99\){concluding there is no duty of
good faith and fair dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a third-party claimant seeking to
recover against the company's insured). "[A]n action for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing may be brought only by a party to the insurance contract." Savage v. Educators
Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1995); see also Bad Faith Claims Against Insurers: The State
of Utah Law Fifteen Years after Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 15 BYU J. Pub. L. 53
(2000).
Given the clear rule in Utah that a third party beneficiary of an insurance contract does
not have standing to sue for the breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff, as a third
party beneficiary of the insurance contract, camiot bring a cause of action for the breach of duty
of good faith and fair dealing against Defendants.2 Plaintiff and Defendants share no privity of
contract for the duty of good faith and fair dealing to attach; rather that privity runs between
Defendants and non-party Salazar. The Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact
exist on the breach of contract claim and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count
I.

2

The Court notes that there are situations where a third party beneficiary of an insurance
contract may have standing to sue the insurer, but the situation in the case at bar is not one of
them.

As an alternative basis for granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the Court
concludes that even if Plaintiff had standing to sue Defendants for the breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendants met the
requirements of Utah law for Salazar to reject underinsured motorist coverage. Utah law requires
that every automobile insurance policy shall include underinsured coverage, unless affinnatively
waived under Section 31A-22-305.3(2) of the Utah Code. Utah Code § 31 A-22-302(l)(c). A
named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an express writing on "a form
provided by the insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured
motorist coverage and when it would be applicable." Utah Code § 31A-22-305.3(2)(g). For an
effective rejection of underinsured coverage in its entirety, the statute imposes a duty on the
insurer to provide a form that reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage
and when underinsured motorist coverage would be applicable for a rejection of the
underinsurance coverage to be valid.3 hi reviewing Defendants' form in footnote 1 signed by

3

hi General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona v. Tipton, 158 P.3d 1121, n.5 (Utah
Ct. App. 2007), cert denied, Fulcrum v. Tipton, 2007 Utah LEXIS 127 (UT 2007), the Utah
Court of Appeals distinguished two subsections of the uninsured statute. This Court applies the
same distinction to the underinsured statute. Specifically, subsection 2(b) of § 31 A-22-305.3
states:
For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of underinsured
motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the
insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledgement
form that:
(i) is filed with the department;
(ii) is provided by the insurer;
(iii) waives the higher coverage;
(iv) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage;
and

Salazar, the Court concludes that the form clearly incorporates statutory language to reasonably
explain the puipose of underinsured motorist coverage and when underinsured motorist coverage
would be applicable. The fact that Salazar selected uninsured motorist coverage and rejected
underinsured motorist coverage reflects a rational decision on her part to select certain coverage
and reject other coverage. The breach of contract claim fails because Plaintiff cannot establish
there was a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Non-party Salazar rejected
underinsured motorist coverage so the policy does not contain the coverage Plaintiff seeks.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment even if the Plaintiff had standing to
sue for the breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing because no genuine issues of material
fact exist that the Defendants met the statutory requirements of Utah law.
PLAINTIFF'S COUNT II - Class Action Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a purported class, alleges a breach of contract action
against Defendants. The basis of Plaintiff s purported class action claims are based on the
implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, As stated above, supra Count I,
Defendants owed no implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff
has no breach of contract cause of action for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
against Defendants. To represent a class of people, Plaintiff should be in a same or similar

(v) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle
liability coverage or the maximum undersinsured motorist coverage limits available by
the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
Subsection 2(b) specifically relates to the situation when an insurance consumer is choosing to
waive a higher level of underinsured motorist coverage, but is not rejecting such coverage
entirely. Whereas, in this case before the Court, Salazar rejected underinsured coverage in its
entirety, the Court applies subsection 2(g) of § 31 A-22-305.3, rather than subsection 2(b).

position as those in the class. Since there is no class of litigants like Plaintiff that would have a
claim against Defendants, Plaintiff does not have an adequate interest to have standing to
represent the class. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Count II.
PLAINTIFF'S COUNT III - Individual Negligence Claim by Lopez
Plaintiff claims Defendants were negligent in their statutory duty to inform her and
Salazar of the meaning, and the purposes of underinsured motorist coverage, together with
premiums charged for that coverage, at a minimum in a form that correctly complied with these
duties in English, as well as in Spanish, the language spoken by the class of consumers that
Defendants specifically market.
To support a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that defendant
owed plaintiff a duty, defendant breached the duty, and the breach of the duty was the proximate
cause of plaintiff s injury and damages. Rose v. Provo City, 67 P.3d 1017, 1020 (Utah Ct. App.
2003). The issue of whether there is a duty requires an analysis of the legal relations between the
parties. Lovelandv, Orem City Corp. 746 P.2d 763, 778 (Utah 1987). Legal duties are often
found to exist in the context of contractual, fiduciary, and filial relationships. AMS Salt
Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corporation of America, 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that in some cases the acts constituting a breach
of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract and may give
rise to causes of action in tort. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 n.3. For example,
a duty to refrain from intentionally causing severe emotional distress to others, breach of duty to

bargain in good faith could amount to fraudulent activity, or under various unfair practices acts,
there may be statutory requirements that give rise to independent torts. Id.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants' statutory duty to infonn Salazar on the underinsured
coverage extended to her as an occupant of non-party Salazar's car. The Court disagrees that
Defendants statutory duty to infonn applied to Plaintiff. The statutory duty was owed to Salazar,
not Plaintiff. Plaintiff was not a party to the insurance contract between Salazar and Defendants.
Accordingly, she cannot claim there was a breach of the statutory duty to inform her. To extend
the statutory duty to inform to a statutory third party beneficiary of an insurance contract would
be difficult, if not impossible, to do. At the time of contracting for an insurance policy, the
insurer and insured would have to determine who the statutory third party beneficiaries of the
insurance contract are, who that would include in the context of the insured and then somehow
infonn those statutory third party beneficiaries of the insured's decision to reject underinsured
motorist coverage. This would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do.
For example, an insured rejects underinsured motorist coverage. A week later, the
insured offers a ride to a new co-worker the insured just met. If they were involved in an
accident, the new co-worker would be a statutory third party beneficiary to the insured's policy.
However, the new co-worker would not have received information that the insured rejected
underinsurance coverage until he or she made a claim to the insurer and such claim was denied.
At the time of contracting, neither the insured nor the insurer could have anticipated that a
"stranger" would be riding in the insured's vehicle and therefore, would be a statutory third party
beneficiary entitled to notice of the insured's waiver of underinsured motorist coverage. Under
the Plaintiffs theory, the insurer would have had a duty to inform the new co-worker without the

ability to do so and the Plaintiffs theory would require the insurer to provide the waived
coverage for underinsured motorist coverage. The Court does not agree that the insurer's
statutory duty to inform extends this far. Utah law imposes a duty on the insurer to inform the
insured of coverages that the insured may waive, so that an insured can make an informed
decision on the insurance coverage they are contracting for. To impose the statutory duty to
inform to statutory third party beneficiaries would be extending the insurer's duty too far and
interfere with the insurer and insured's ability to contract for insurance coverage. If the
Plaintiffs rule were adopted, the impact would be to null the insurer and insured's ability to
contract because even if an insured properly waived their statutory right to underinsured motorist
coverage and did not pay a premium for it, an insurer would still be required to pay underinsured
motorist coverage to statutory third party beneficiaries because the insurer did not give them
notice of the insured's exercised right to waive the statutory underinsured motorist coverage.
The Court concludes that there is no such duty for an insurer to inform third party beneficiaries
of an insured's waiver of the statutory underinsured motorist coverage.
Plaintiff also claims there was a duty for Defendants forms to be in Spanish. However,
Plaintiff fails to cite a statute, case law or insurance department regulation requiring that such
forms and explanation be provided in Spanish. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to show that there is a
duty to do so.
In summary, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a negligence claim because there is no
legal duty for an insurer to inform a passenger in an insured's vehicle of the insured's waiver of
statutory underinsured motorist coverage and there was no legal duty to provide the forms in

Spanish. Without a legal duty to Plaintiff, there can be no prima facie showing of a negligence
claim and the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count III.
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Defendants request the Court declare the (1) the waiver of underinsured motorist
coverage by Miriam Salazar complied with the relevant provisions of the Utah Code, and
therefore is valid, (2) UAIC Policy Number UTS 000611667 issued to Miriam Salazar does not
contain underinsured motorist coverage, (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to underinsured motorist
benefits under UAIC Policy Number UTS 000611667, and (4) that each party shall bear their
own costs of suit, including paying their own attorneys fees and costs.
"Generally, courts have held that the conditions which must exist before a declaratory
judgment action can be maintained are: (1) a justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the
parties must be adverse; (3) the party seeking such relief must have a legally protectible interest
in the controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties involved must be ripe for judicial
detennination." Bairdv, State, 574 P.2d 713,715 (Utah 1978). The declaratory judgment statute
does not remove the keystone from "our judicialframework—thepresence of a justiciable
controversy—and reconfigure our courts into forums where the curious or the confused may
acquire legal guidance." Id. at 716. "A Declaratory Judgment Statute cannot be so construed as
to authorize the courts to deliver advisory opinions or pronounce judgments on abstract
questions, but there must be the invariable justiciable controversy present in such cases." Id.
'The courts have no jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment in the absence of a justiciable
or actual controversy" Id.

The Court's decision pertaining to Counts I, II and IH reflect that Plaintiff claims against
Defendants fail. The effect of the Court's decision is to grant summary judgment in favor of
Defendants. No longer is there a justiciable controversy between the parties. Accordingly, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to make further declarations on additional issues. A decision on issues,
other than those addressed above, would be wholly advisory. "When it is ascertained that there is
no jurisdiction in the court because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the court can
go no further, and its immediate duty is to dismiss the action, and jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by consent or any other act of the parties." Id. To make a declaratory judgment on
additional issues would exceed this Court's jurisdiction, therefore, the Court DENIES
Defendants counterclaim for declaratory judgment.
ORDER
The Court hereby ORDERS:
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART, specifically, the Court:
GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on
Plaintiffs Counts I, II and IE, and
DENIES summary judgment on Defendants Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment
because such declaration would be advisory and would exceed the Court's jurisdiction.
DATED this J_ day of September, 2008.
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